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China’s civil society is under immense pressure. Since President Xi Jin-ping came to power in late 2012, Chinese authorities have crackeddown on a score of civil society organisations, while hundreds of ac-
tivists and dissidents have been detained, arrested, and sentenced to prison.
Control over cyberspace has been further tightened, and a new commission
has been established to oversee national security across a wide spectrum
of issues. A campaign against “Western values” has been launched, and even
the term “civil society” is becoming increasingly sensitive in public or class-
room discussion. As the crackdown continues, one might wonder whether
the fang/shou cycle, the alternating pattern of relaxation and control that
unleashed China’s “reform and opening up” in the 1980s and 1990s, is still
applicable under Xi’s China, where control (shou) has now become the norm
and relaxation (fang) the exception. Previously, moderate or “issue-based”
groups and activists, although under constant state surveillance, remained
intact as long as they steered clear of a political agenda. An Economist ar-
ticle in April 2014 even argued that “a flourishing civil society is taking
hold.” (1) A year later, however, it has become questionable whether such an
observation is still valid. 
What are the implications for the development of China’s civil society?
This paper reviews recent crackdown efforts and new restrictions on civil
society, and argues that these measures are diminishing the space for mod-
erate and reformist NGOs and activists to negotiate their survival. It also
shows that ad-hoc repression of civil society groups and activists is now
moving towards a more systematic restriction of both foreign and domestic
NGOs. While civil society is unlikely to disappear due to its resilience and
its ability to adapt to barriers, there is little cause for optimism in the com-
ing years. 
Rampant crackdown on civil society
In the early days after Xi Jinping assumed office as China’s president, the
question of whether he was a liberal political reformer emerged among
China observers. Yet the debate was brief and speculation was quickly dis-
pelled. As Xi launched a rampant anti-corruption drive targeting both
“tigers” and “flies,” the successive downfall of high-ranking officials neither
opened up room for public criticism of the government nor created space
for grassroots civil society to expand and prosper. Instead, Xi ruled out po-
litical reform, emphasised cadres’ adherence to the central leadership of the
Party, and revived the “mass line” as a Maoist alternative to democracy so
as to rebuild the Party’s legitimacy among the masses. (2) In addition, Xi also
warned against dangerous Western values that constitute ideological threats
to China, highlighting seven ideas, including universal values, freedom of
speech, and civil society, to be forbidden in public discussion. (3) On the in-
stitutional level, Xi’s administration founded at least two governmental or-
ganisations delegated with expansive power over Chinese society. The
National Security Commission, established in early 2014, was made respon-
sible for coordinating a range of national security tasks and making relevant
policies, putting paramount importance on safeguarding state security.
Meanwhile, a new Internet regulatory body, the Cyberspace Administration
of China, was endowed with expanded powers to defend cybersecurity
against both domestic and foreign threats. 
Against the backdrop of a tightened political and ideological space under
Xi’s rule, the spate of crackdowns against civil society groups and activists
came as no surprise. Several activists and opinion leaders were detained
and arrested as early as 2013, the most prominent being Xu Zhiyong, a
legal activist and the founder of the New Citizens’ Movement (xin gong-
min yundong 新公民运动), who was placed under house arrest in April
2013. Whereas Xu was sentenced to four years in prison in early 2014 for
“disturbing public order,” crackdown efforts on activists did not subside
and even intensified. In May 2014, after a closed-door seminar held to
commemorate the 25th anniversary of June Fourth, at least 12 of the 16
participants, a group consisting of intellectuals and activists, were de-
tained. (4) Although most of them were soon released, rights lawyer Pu
Zhiqiang has remained under arrest ever since, and was formally charged
with inciting ethnic hatred and “picking quarrels and provoking trouble”
in May 2015. (5) Another rights lawyer, Tang Jingling, a campaigner against
graft and land seizures, was taken from his Guangzhou home ahead of the
June Fourth anniversary, and was later charged with “inciting subver-
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sion.” (6) The 71-year-old journalist Gao Yu was criminally detained in May
for allegedly leaking state secrets to a foreign news site, and was later
sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. In September 2014, Ilham Tohti,
a Uyghur scholar and vocal advocate for minority rights detained since
January 2014, was found guilty of separatism and handed a life sentence,
the harshest treatment for a rights activist thus far. (7) Then in October,
dozens of mainland Chinese were detained for supporting Hong Kong’s
Occupy protests. (8) The scope of the civil society crackdown stretched be-
yond individual activists to civil society organisations. The Transition In-
stitute, a moderately-positioned think-tank engaged in rights advocacy,
was shut down by the authorities in July 2013. Its co-founder, Guo Yushan,
who helped the blind activist Chen Guangcheng escape from house arrest,
has been detained on the criminal charge of “provoking trouble” since Oc-
tober 2014. Another target was the Liren Rural Library, a chain library proj-
ect aimed at providing children in underprivileged areas with free access
to books. The NGO announced in September 2014 that all of its libraries
across China would be closed down after repeated inspections and crack-
downs by local authorities. (9)
A common thread that ran through these cases of repression was their en-
gagement in certain areas of rights protection (weiquan 维权) and the involve-
ment of reform-minded activists or intellectuals. The weiquan movement,
which started around 2003, has been a recurrent target of repression for both
central and local authorities. With the rampant ongoing repression under Xi’s
administration, however, the implication is that even moderate, depoliticised,
and reformist civil society engagement without any stated political goals or
intention to overthrow the Communist Party, which had been a strategy for
many civic groups to maintain survival, is now running into a dead end. 
In a 2012 article analysing government-NGO relationships in China, Wu
Fengshi and Chan Kin-man use the concept of “graduated controls” (fenlei
guanzhi 分类管治) to describe the state’s differentiated approach on three
types of NGOs, namely those involved in service delivery, those involved in
service or advocacy in non-sensitive areas, and those involved in
political/religious/ethnic or other sensitive areas. (10) The authors argue that
while the second category of NGOs did attract more attention from the
supervising authorities and public security than the service delivery ones,
they were given considerable breathing space and were not subject to con-
stant crackdowns as were the third category. But as the Chinese government
is adopting an increasingly militant approach towards civil society, the space
for these mid-range NGOs might be disappearing, and the policy of “grad-
uated controls,” which gives rise to flexibility, might be gradually replaced
by a friend-or-foe approach. One revealing example would be the Sunflower
Women Workers’ Centre (Xiangyanghua nügong huodong zhongxin 向阳花
女工活动中心) in Panyu, Guangdong Province, a grassroots NGO providing
leisure activities for female migrant workers and occasionally engaging in
rights defence activities. Despite initial support from the local authorities
to promote migrant services when it successfully registered in 2012, the
NGO has since been repeatedly harassed by thugs, forced to move by land-
lords, and most recently threatened with closure by local officials. (11)
The repression against NGOs is further entrenched by how local bureau-
cratic apparatuses implement the task of stability maintenance. As Hong
Kong-based activist Zeng Jinyan argues based on the case of Guo Yushan,
the tasks of “maintaining stability,” especially for a younger generation of
state security police, “has now become depoliticized, operationalized, rou-
tinized and commercialized.” She attributes the problem to the goal-ori-
ented nature of local authorities:
Instead of seeking solutions to real social problems, this product-ori-
ented bureaucracy is geared only towards the perceived “quick fix”
of suppression. Guided by this new methodology, the state security
apparatus has no real interest in distinguishing the content and na-
ture of different activists’ work, their individual characteristics, the
threat they pose to the regime or their level of cooperation with the
state, nor are the police keen to weigh the impact of their arrest on
the government’s performance and public image. This new method-
ology has turned rights activists into standardized objects of busi-
ness. (12)
Thus, even pragmatic, reformist NGOs and activists have become indis-
criminate targets of repression. In the case of Liren, where the rationale for
repression seemed less clear given that rural libraries are not politically sen-
sitive from its outlook, the NGO’s vast geographical coverage in remote re-
gions might have alarmed the authorities for its potential reach across the
heartland of China. As Gary King’s finding on China’s Internet control im-
plies, the logic of censorship or stability maintenance lies not in the act and
content itself, but rather in its reach and mobilisational potential. (13)
The demise of issue-based activism: An
overview
Environment
Environmentalism has long enjoyed relative leniency as long as it remains
within certain bounds. However, while a recent environmental documentary
enjoyed a window of free discussion ahead of the annual “Two Sessions”
(lianghui 两会), it was blocked after becoming too popular. The 103-minute
documentary, entitled “Under the Dome” (Qiongding zhixia 穹頂之下), was
produced by former CCTV news anchor Chai Jing and was released on the
Internet on 28 February 2015. Featuring a TED-talk presentation style and
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using a variety of video footage, scientific data, and interviews with re-
searchers and government officials, the documentary identified the wide
usage of fossil fuels and the lack of government oversight as the primary
causes behind the heavy smog in China. Although the film did not attack
the Chinese political system as a whole, it drew attention to the role of
state-owned oil companies in setting the country’s lagging fuel standards
and called for government action in regulating polluters and improving air
quality. Within three days of its release, the film was viewed more than 150
million times on major Chinese video portals such as Tencent and Youku,
and prompted 280 million posts on the microblogging site Sina Weibo. (14)
Its phenomenal success became a sudden and rare opening for citizens-
at-large to discuss and vent grievances on a sensitive topic that had long
been politically taboo in the country. (15) It even received backing from the
state-run media, as People’s Daily re-posted the film alongside an interview
with Chai one day after the film’s release, while Chen Jining, the newly ap-
pointed Minister of Environmental Protection, praised the film as “worthy
of admiration.” (16) Such unusual support from high-ranking officials, in ad-
dition to Chai’s access to political elites in the film, raised suspicions that it
was an orchestrated effort for some political factions to attack their ene-
mies. Others criticised Chai’s film as nothing but a cliché because it buried
the most important social and political factors, attributing the smog prob-
lem to only economic and technological factors. (17) Nevertheless, the open-
ing was short-lived. The film’s virality and the amount of discussion it
generated prompted the propaganda authorities to order news units to dis-
continue coverage, including Chai’s interview with the People’s Daily, and
all video portals to remove the film. Keywords related to the film have been
blocked from microblogs since then. 
Women’s rights and public health
In another area of activism that has traditionally enjoyed some overlap
with official discourse, at least ten feminist activists were detained ahead
of International Women’s Day on March 8. The arrests initially seemed to
target a nationwide campaign against sexual harassment on public trans-
portation on that day, when feminist activists had planned to distribute
leaflets and post stickers on public transit. (18) Unlike previous crackdowns
in which arrests usually targeted particular organisations or individuals, this
time the crackdown was a coordinated effort against an activist network
across the country. Most of the detained activists were released after being
interrogated, but five remained in detention in three Chinese cities – Beijing,
Hangzhou, and Guangzhou. The arrests drew widespread attention. Foreign
governments and human rights groups called for the women’s release, and
a #FreeTheFive campaign was initiated on social media to solicit public
support globally. Support for the detained activists even came from within
China, as academics echoed their cause and students signed petitions de-
manding their immediate release. 
Given that feminist or anti-discrimination activism does not have overt
political motives and had been largely tolerated by the state authorities in
the past, the latest crackdown appeared to be a curious move. One feminist
activist believed that the repression was not related to the action itself, but
was instead an expression of the government’s will to crack down on a series
of former actions that attracted public attention, and hence warranted gov-
ernment repression. (19) Others said that public security officials had been
alarmed by the activists’ “skillful use of social media to organize volunteers,
their links to foreign organizations, and the inventive protests and flash
mobs that often drew favorable coverage in the Chinese media,” which have
yielded measurable results, including a landmark bill on domestic vio-
lence. (20) However, while the five activists were still under detention, the
raid of the Beijing office of Yirenping 益仁平, a prominent public health and
anti-discrimination NGO that has been championing gender equality and
often employs litigation to fight discrimination, showed that the target was
after all not just feminist activism. On 24 March, a score of men dressed in
police uniforms raided the NGO’s Beijing office, confiscating its computers
and documents while locking employees out of the building. It appeared
that the crackdown on Yirenping was connected with its support for feminist
activism since 2012, including a series of performance art actions, as Yiren-
ping’s co-founder Lu Jun said in a statement. (21)
Nevertheless, Chinese gender scholar Wang Zheng believed that the ulti-
mate target for the series of crackdown was Yirenping rather than the fem-
inist activists. In an interview, she said that “the authorities probably don’t
want to make too big a splash by arresting the head of Yirenping, so they
detained these young women to send the message.” (22) In an interview with
China Digital Times, however, Lu Jun said it was unclear whether the deten-
tion of the five feminists was targeting Yirenping, but he was certain that
the NGO was not the only target of the crackdown. (23) Whichever the au-
thorities might be targeting, the high-profile raid of Yirenping, which oc-
curred as the International Olympic Committee was considering Beijing’s
bid to host the 2022 Winter Olympics, (24) demonstrated that the govern-
ment had either decided to ignore international reactions or underestimated
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the impact of its action. Pressured by international pleas, the Chinese gov-
ernment eventually released the five activists after detaining them for more
than a month, just before official charges had to be made. (25) But the release
was conditional, and the government retained a hard-line position against
Yirenping. Not only did the foreign ministry spokesman state publicly in
mid-April that the NGO “had violated the law and will be punished,” secu-
rity officials continued the crackdown on related activists. In early June
2015, human rights activists and former Yirenping employees Guo Bin and
Yang Zhanqing were detained in Shenzhen and Huizhou respectively on
charges of “illegal business operation.” (26)
Lawyers
Just as Guo and Yang were released after one month of detention, public
security authorities launched yet another large-scale crackdown on activists
– this time on rights lawyers. The crackdown began on 9 July and continued
over the next few days, when nearly 200 Chinese lawyers and activists were
detained or questioned by the police or went into hiding. (27) At the heart of
the operation was the Beijing Fengrui Law Office, a law firm specialised in
rights cases, where at least five employees, including three prominent rights
lawyers, were taken away by the Beijing police or went missing. The firm is
the former employer of activist Wu Gan, nicknamed “Super Vulgar Butcher”
(chaoji disu tufu 超级低俗屠夫), who has been charged with “inciting sub-
version.” Wu was believed to be targeted for drawing public attention to
the May 2015 Qing’an Incident, in which the deadly police shooting of a
young man triggered wide public discussion and calls for an independent
investigation, as well as a petition signed by more than 700 lawyers de-
manding the release for six lawyers detained in Qing’an. (28) The Ministry of
Public Security issued a statement on 11 July charging the group, led by the
Fengrui Law Firm, labelled a “criminal syndicate,” of disrupting public order
and seeking profits by illegally hiring protesters and swaying court decisions
in the name of “defending justice and public interests.” (29) People’s Daily
also ran a long report detailing the allegations, while two Fengrui employees
made confessions on state-run CCTV, admitting to being paid and paying
others to hype sensitive cases. Similar to the arrests of the feminist activists,
the crackdown on rights lawyers was also a nationwide campaign. Yet, with
almost 200 targeted across China, the scale of repression was much larger
and quite unprecedented. The operation appeared to be more concerted
and high profile than previous crackdowns, as the arrests were immediately
followed by a media campaign to associate the detainees with a “criminal
gang.” 
Legal restrictions on foreign NGOs
While ad hoc repression continues against civil society activists and or-
ganisations, there are signs that a more comprehensive control of civil so-
ciety activities is emerging. In December 2014, the Chinese government
proposed a new law in the legislature that aims at regulating foreign NGOs
operating in China. Proposed along with a draft National Security Law
amidst President Xi’s call for the promotion of rule of law, (30) the draft For-
eign NGO Management Law, which consists of nine chapters and 67 articles
as of its second reading draft, establishes procedures for foreign-based non-
profit organisations to register formally and conduct activities in China. The
proposed law follows a recent trend among countries such as India and Rus-
sia that have enacted laws restricting foreign funding of NGOs, partly to
forestall foreign threats against national security. (31) The Chinese law was
motivated by a similar purpose. It places foreign NGOs in China as well as
their temporary activities under greater state scrutiny, requiring them to be
sponsored by a professional supervisory unit (PSU) authorised by the gov-
ernment and also to be registered with a registration management organ
(RMO), i.e., the local public security bureau, before conducting activities in
China. Activities with a duration of less than a year require temporary ac-
tivity permits from PSUs or state organs, or Chinese partners approved by
the public security authorities. To a certain extent, the requirement of reg-
istration and supervision resembles the dual registration of domestic NGOs,
a system that has been gradually abolished in recent years, contributing to
a surge of domestic NGOs. The new draft law, on the contrary, appears to
be a step backwards for foreign counterparts.
There are at least a few problems worth highlighting in the impending
law. First is the law’s expansive and limitless coverage. The word foreign, or
jingwai 境外, is referred to as extra-jurisdictional, and includes not only for-
eign countries, but also areas with special and controversial status, namely
Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. The term “NGO,” or fei zhengfu zuzhi 非政
府组织, is defined in the law expansively as “non-profit, non-governmental
social organisations,” meaning that even universities, professional associa-
tions, and interest groups would fall within the scope. In addition, while the
law applies to their “activities,” or huodong 活动, within the territory of
China, the term is left undefined, which in effect allows it to encompass
anything. Second is that these vaguely-defined terms would give rise to
varying legal interpretations and the exercise of discretionary powers by
the authorities. For instance, Article 59 lists several circumstances in which
registration of foreign NGOs would be revoked and the person-in-charge
could be detained, including “the subversion of state power,” “undermining
ethnic harmony,” “engaging in separatism,” “inciting resistance against en-
forcement of state law or administrative regulations,” “gathering state se-
crets or intelligence,” and any “other activity that either endangers state
security or damages the national or public interest,” etc. While these span
a broad range of potential offences, the last item covers anything that could
be interpreted by the authorities as “national or public interest.” Third is the
transfer of registration from the civil affairs to public security departments.
This would not just expand the scope of stability maintenance (weiwen 维
稳) and the jurisdiction of the public security organs, but also generate im-
mense police powers, such as the searching of representative offices, seizure
of materials, and detention of representatives without warrant. Furthermore,
it would also diminish the grey zone in which foreign NGOs were tacitly
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sanctioned by the state authorities to operate, which was partly due to the
lack of legal provision. (32) With the legislation of a formal law, such space
for toleration will officially diminish. 
Fourth, the requirement for dual registration not only creates multiple and
overlapping layers of authority, but also extra administrative constraints
and burdens. Article 24 and Article 37 respectively require foreign NGOs to
submit an annual activity plan and an annual report to both the PSU and
RMO, but the level of detail required by them and the flexibility they allow
remain unclear. If all activities are required to be reported in the plan, it will
constrain the flexibility of foreign NGOs to respond to emergencies or act
on windows of opportunity, not to mention additional administrative work.
Articles 26 and 27 limit their sources and use of funding, prohibiting
fundraising and acceptance of donations within China while requiring them
to use funds from registered bank accounts, or those from their Chinese
partners if they are on temporary permits. Articles 32 to 35 make require-
ments for personnel arrangements, under which foreign NGOs cannot de-
velop membership and must recruit local staff and volunteers through an
intermediary management agency. While these rules give both the PSU and
public security authorities broad powers and discretion to keep track of and
influence their activities, grant-attribution, and personnel decisions, articles
45 to 51 would also grant them unrestricted access to their offices, com-
puters, and bank accounts. Violations of the law, which are handled by the
public security organs alone and do not require court rulings, would be liable
to warnings, confiscations, withdrawal of registrations and permits, fines, or
even administrative detention for up to 15 days. With the broad scope of
the law and the new responsibilities taken up by the PSUs and RMOs, one
question would be whether the state organs responsible for registration and
supervision will have the capacity and manpower to take up the extra ad-
ministrative work. The sudden increase in workload, in addition to the de-
centralised implementation by local governments, might after all lead to
selective and arbitrary enforcement of the law. This would undermine rather
than strengthen the rule of law as intended by the act of legislation.
But the greatest impact of the law will be on the survival and local part-
nership of foreign NGOs. In order for foreign NGOs to maintain their
foothold in China, many might choose to avoid projects in areas that the
authorities deem sensitive, such as those involved in rights and labour issues.
In addition, as noted by Professor Chan Kin-man, a sociologist at the Chinese
University of Hong Kong, the layers of supervision required by the law would
stifle international NGO cooperation with domestic partners, and registered
foreign NGOs could get into trouble for working with unregistered domestic
partners. (33) On the other hand, it might encourage self-censorship among
foreign organisations with connections to China. For instance, foreign uni-
versities, which would be included in the law, might censor their academic
or student activities to avoid antagonising the Chinese government so that
student admissions, exchange programs, partnership with schools, or satel-
lite campuses in China would not be affected. The repercussions also reach
well beyond foreign NGOs. Article 38, for instance, says that “individuals,
legal persons, and other organisations within mainland China may not ac-
cept commissions and funds from foreign NGOs that have neither regis-
tered a representative office nor obtained a temporary activity permit, or
represent or covertly represent the non-mainland NGOs in conducting ac-
tivities.” This would mean that grassroots NGOs in China, many of which
are involved in a broad range of issues from the environment to human
rights and are supported by foreign funding and training, can no longer be
financially sponsored by unregistered foreign organisations. The withdrawal
of these foreign partners from China would certainly curtail the funding
and knowledge transfer on which domestic NGOs heavily rely. 
Chambers of commerce and business groups were also deeply concerned
about the implications of the draft law on foreign business activities in
China. Most notably, a group of 45 U.S. business and professional organisa-
tions, representing various industries, signed a letter urging the Chinese gov-
ernment to modify the draft law. (34) The letter argued that the scope of the
law is too broad, as the definition of NGO would encompass trade associ-
ations, overseas chambers of commerce, professional associations, univer-
sities, and environmental organisations, which play an integral part in the
daily operations of foreign companies. It also raised concerns that the law
put management of these groups under the public security organs, which
might severely impact commercial activities and business operations. Nev-
ertheless, there were others who believed that the draft law was not as neg-
ative as has been argued. Writing in a ChinaFile conversation, Taisu Zhang,
a legal scholar at Duke University, argued that the draft legislation might
not represent a serious deterioration in the legal status of foreign NGOs
because “[t]he specter of arbitrary police interference and highly ambiguous
administrative review has always hung over foreign NGOs.” On the contrary,
the law would instead “eliminate some of the ambiguity surrounding issues
such as registration, and does not seem to either add or subtract signifi-
cantly from the amount of power wielded by public security organs.” Al-
though he agreed with the possibility of a social chilling effect, it would still
lower the administrative costs of operating in China, “insofar as it provides
a somewhat clearer roadmap of the legal and administrative hurdles that
one must overcome.” (35) While Zhang might be right from a legalist per-
spective in arguing that clearer rules lower administrative costs, he seemed
to be less concerned about how the content of the law might raise operat-
ing costs, given the burdensome procedures of registration and supervision,
and the possible imposition of external costs on domestic civil society if
foreign partners decide to reduce or withdraw their operations. 
Ultimately, the most questionable aspect of the law is the legislative in-
tent. As Tsinghua University scholar Jia Xijin says, it is rather unnecessary,
from a legal perspective, to separate the management of foreign NGOs
from domestic ones, namely social organisations (shehui tuanti 社会团体),
private non-enterprises (minban feiqiye 民办非企业), and foundations (ji-
jinhui 基金会) – all of which are already governed by corresponding laws.
The imperative to identify foreign NGOs as a distinct category, governed
by a separate set of rules, is hence reflective of the Chinese government’s
profound unease over their threat to national security, an area in which a
separate law is being legislated in parallel. If the objective of legislation is
to safeguard national security, Jia argues, it would be more appropriate to
enact a conduct-based law as opposed to one based on whether organisa-
tions are foreign or not. No amendment could eliminate or lessen such an
existential concern. But if the legislation were to proceed according to plan,
at least one amendment, as suggested by Jia, seems necessary: the law
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needs to include an appeal process for rejections and non-approvals. 
Although the second draft has relaxed stipulations to allow foreign NGOs
to open branch offices with the State Council’s permission, in order to ac-
commodate the fact that many science- and technology-related foreign
NGOs already have branch offices, (36) the content remained largely un-
changed from the first draft, and is not expected to include drastic changes
in its third revision before proceeding to final approval in the legislature,
which is expected by the end of 2015. On 1 July, the National People’s Con-
gress enacted the National Security Law, extending state security power
across a wide spectrum, from cyberspace to the outer space. Another draft
law on counter-terrorism is also under consideration. 
While domestic NGOs now face being cut off from their foreign partners,
the Chinese government is proposing new regulations to strengthen Party
control over them. A new Politburo directive released in June 2015 has
stressed the need to establish a Party members’ group in all domestic social
organisations alongside state organs and state-owned and private enter-
prises, a move that was said to reflect the Party’s anxiousness to bolster its
authority across society. (37) Central Party School professor Zhang Xixian
said that the continued growth of domestic NGOs had prompted the cen-
tral government to require them “to establish Party groups in order to better
guide their development,” as they are “more focused on directly leading the
organization to follow the core values of the Communist Party.” (38) Previ-
ously, all social organisations were permitted to establish Party member
groups, but now they will be required to do so, although the exact measures
are not yet clear. 
Conclusion
For now, China’s civil society is unlikely to inject new impetus into political
reform. As the recent spate of crackdowns on civil society activists under
the Xi administration shows, the space for moderate, reformist civic partic-
ipation has been shrinking, and relaxation has become an exception rather
than part of an alternate cycle. With a new foreign NGO law in sight, the
practice of ad-hoc repression, which often leads to backlashes from both
within and abroad, will be complemented by a more systematic legal code
that sophisticates the Party’s control over civil society activities connected
to foreign non-profits. The new Party directive ordering domestic social or-
ganisations to set up Party members’ groups will similarly extend the Party’s
reach over the expanding local civil society landscape.
The only reason to be optimistic is that China’s resilient civil society is
constantly adapting to avoid crackdowns and circumvent barriers. For in-
stance, the feminist movement, which comprises a loose network of ac-
tivists and intellectuals and makes use of the Internet and social media to
advance their causes and connections, suggests the emergence of a form
of network-based civil society rather different from the conventional form
based on NGOs and individual activists. The absence of formal organisa-
tional structure, and the fact that no single representative can be held re-
sponsible, gives a lot of flexibility and fluidity to these civil society networks,
hence making them much more difficult to track and crack down on. While
these will generate new dynamics of civic participation, the changes, in light
of the Party’s stronger grip and new restrictions, will certainly be slow, pro-
tracted, and subtle.
z Samson Yuen is a PhD candidate in politics at the University of
Oxford and is a research assistant at the CEFC
(samson.yuen@sant.ox.ac.uk).
56 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 5 / 3
36. “Draft law to protect overseas NGOs in China,” Xinhua, 20 April 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/
english/2015-04/20/c_134165975.htm (accessed on 25 June 2015). 
37. “Communist Party seeks to bolster authority with new rule for branches across China,” South
China Morning Post, 30 May 2015, www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/
1813133/communist-party-seeks-bolster-authority-new-rule (accessed on 25 June 2015); on
PONGOs (Party-organised NGOs) see also the following article: Patricia Thornton, “The Advance
of the Party: Transformation or Takeover of Urban Grassroots Society?,” The China Quarterly, No.
213, 2013, pp. 1-18.
38. “Zhonggong zhongyang mingque zai shehui zuzhi lingdao jiguan zhong sheli dangzu” (Party Cen-
tral clearly vowed to establish Party members’ groups in social organisations), Xinhua, 30 May
2015, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2015/0530/c70731-27078843.html (accessed on 3 July
2015). 
Current affairs
CEFC News Analysis is compiled from the CEFC's fortnightly selection
of Press Highlights, available at www.cefc.com.hk.
